8. The political economy of global economic disgovernance

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INTRODUCTION

Global governance is an expression which became popular in the 1990s to convey the idea that, in the world arena, nation-states have lost autonomy and relevance insofar as a multitude of other players – multilateral institutions, organizations of civil society, global social movements, multinational enterprises – have an increasing role to play. Roseneau (1990, 1997) was probably the first theoretician to discuss fully – and at a sophisticated academic level – this theme, which today has accumulated a large bibliography. The general idea was that globalization was causing the nation-states to lose relevance, while a large number of other global actors, beginning with international financial institutions, passing by non-profit organizations constituting a global civil society, and ending in the multinational business enterprises, were creating a network that effectively governed the world. In other words, the world was changing from international to global. I am not going to discuss here this idea which I understand to be moderately based on reality and strongly charged with ideology. There is no doubt that since World War II mankind is gradually building an international political system under the umbrella of the United Nations, that should not be confused with this fuzzy governance concept; it is also true that some kind of global civil society is emerging; but the idea that nation-states lost relevance because they became more interdependent is a way through which developed countries try to check the competition coming from cheap-labor middle-income countries rather than a reality. In fact, greater interdependence among nation-states makes them more directly competitive in the global arena, and thus, more strategic, not less.
On its turn, economic global governance is the transposition of the concept for the world-level economic problems that nation-states face today. Since the major actors are by far the nation-states, we should speak of international economic governance rather than global economic governance. Independently however of the word that we use – international or global – what we see today is that world economic governance is precarious. First, because insofar as their respective nation-states are involved in intense international competition, the respective national governments are not able to cooperate effectively and coordinate actions, thus avoiding major crises; second, because a fundamentalist belief in a self-regulating market prevents the necessary actions; third, because the differences of powers and levels of development among nation-states remain substantial, opening room for hegemonic patterns; fourth, because old and new forms of economic populism – particularly exchange rate populism – plague poor and rich countries' economic policies. The first two causes make global economic governance ineffective insofar as it is unable to coordinate actions; the latter two make the system unjust and unstable, tending to balance-of-payments crises.

In this contribution to this edited volume, my central question is to know whether international economic governance really holds in the world today, or whether 'disgovernance' is a better word to express present reality. Global governance per se is non-existent, since only nation-states and the formal international organizations play relevant roles, but is international economic governance a fact or is 'disgovernance' a word that better depicts what is happening? Do we see coordinated macroeconomic policies around the world, or at least among the rich countries, or is what we see today deep imbalances, a looming crisis and an uncertain future? If this is so: why? Which are the immediate and particularly the structural and institutional causes? In order to answer these questions, I will focus my attention on the exchange rate and on the current account. My argument in this chapter is that the world does not really count with economic global governance. We rather have global disgovernance, given the recurrent crises in the developing countries, and the huge current account deficit in the United States. Their direct causes are obviously poor macroeconomic policies on the part of all national actors. Their more indirect causes, however, lie in economic populism, or more specifically, in exchange rate populism, and in the recommendation to adopt the strategy of growth with foreign savings that rich countries have been giving to middle-income ones. Economic populism is not surprising in developing countries, where societies are poorly organized, and elites are often corrupt. It is surprising, however, in the case of the US. Yet, I will suggest some reasons why fiscal and exchange rate populism is
today a real problem to this country. In the second section, I will make a brief survey of the previous attempts to create an international economic governance; in the third section, I will discuss the ‘emerging markets’ crises of the 1970s and particularly of the 1990s, and relate them with the strategy of growth with foreign savings; in the fourth, I will discuss the current account imbalance in the US and look for its indirect causes to exchange rate populism, and the political and social retrocession that this country has been experiencing since World War II, probably as a consequence of the emergence of an aggressive individualism, which rejects the notion of the public and deprives it of the unique moral and political criteria adopted by modern secular societies.

SHORT UPDATE

In a relatively recent past, world economy counted with a governance system. It was clearly an international governance system, not a global one. It was created in 1944, in the Bretton Woods Conference. Its well-known objective was to set an economic governance system based on fixed exchange rates, where the IMF would play the role of chief financial controller and bank of last resource. We may say that the system was fragile and incomplete; that its main shortcoming was the prevalence of the US approach to the problem over the proposal made by Keynes. The fact, however, is that we witnessed its demise in 1971, when the dollar floated. Since then, country after country, with the exception of some Asian economies, liberalized in several degree their international flows and engaged in some sort of exchange rate floating.

With the floating of national currencies and the great increase in capital flows, the central Bretton Woods institution, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), lost relevance as a lender of last resource, and ended up being just a watchdog for the Washington authorities in relation to developing countries. It lost relevance and credibility not only because its reserves were small in comparison with the debts that certain countries were able to achieve in the international financial market, but also because it proved to be an increasingly mistaken policy, in relation to developing countries, to grow with foreign savings, that is, with current account deficits. This strategy appeared for the first time in the 1970s, responding to the possibility and need of recycling the large international reserves accumulated by the oil-producing countries after the 1973 first oil shock. In the end of that decade, a second oil shock, coupled with inflation in the US and a huge increase in the international interest rates, led a large number of developing
countries – the ones heavily indebted – to default: a default which was not decided by them, but by the creditor banks that, one by one, suspended the rollover of the debts. This crisis, besides involving enormous costs for the developing countries (they are still today paying the price of this crisis with decreased rates of growth), represented a threat to the large international banks, and so a risk to the developed economies. Given the threat, their finance ministers, led by the US Treasury, and having as agents the IMF and the World Bank, demonstrated an outstanding capacity of coordination. They gave full support to their banks, and imposed on the highly indebted countries not only necessary fiscal and exchange rate adjustments but also practically the full payment of the debt. The 1985 Baker Plan is usually presented as an example of this coordination, but actually it started before this, when the debt crisis broke down, and was informal rather than formal.

The formal coordination of the world economy was, first, assumed by the G-5 and later by the G-7 – informal institutional devices putting together the finance ministers of the rich countries. They had some successes in coordinating the world economy in the 1980s, when they had to face two major financial problems: the developing countries' debt crisis, and the overvaluation of the dollar. These two problems were new: since the 1930s the world economy had not faced similar challenges. The latter problem was successfully tackled in 1985, with the Plaza Agreement, and involved a coordinated action by the major central banks. Such coordination was relative, but it was sufficient to cause the desired depreciation of dollar, and the elimination of the US current account deficit. The great winner with this agreement was the US, which equilibrated its current account, rescued the dollar, and assured the continuance of its role as the world reserve currency, without incurring a rise in inflation; the major loser was Japan – the country that had based its growth on a relatively devalued exchange rate. The coordination of macroeconomic policies continued with the Louvre Accord in 1986, but the agreed reference indicators soon collapsed.

It is difficult to deny the success of the Plaza Agreement. Not only because it was effective in achieving the stated objectives, but also for a question of correspondence: if countries are supposed to make macroeconomic policy, there is no reason why the world should not. Yet, immediately after the agreements, the classical argument that the devaluation of the dollar would take place anyway was presented: market forces would correct the situation (Feldstein, 1988, pp. 1, 5; Frenkel and Rockett, 1988). Feldstein was strong in his opposition to exchange rate and, more broadly, macroeconomic policy cooperation: 'I believe that the pursuit of exchange rate goals is likely to be both futile and economically
damaging." Why? Because, given the difficulties in putting together different nation-states, "the attempt to pursue coordination in a wide range of macroeconomic policies is likely to result in disagreements and disappointments," and given the assumption that the dollar would anyway continue to decline "because the future trade deficit implied by the dollar's current level would be too large to finance otherwise," the agreements would be meaningless anyway.

The obvious difficulties involved in international coordination coupled with these critiques probably explain the demise of international macroeconomic policy coordination in the 1990s. A third explanation, however, is less well known: the theoretical support for large current account deficits in the developing countries. If since the early 1990s the US Treasury, through the IMF and the World Bank, was advising these countries to engage in a growth cum foreign savings strategy and opening of the capital accounts, it made little sense to think in coordinate exchange rates: at least the exchange rate of the developing countries which accepted that strategy would necessarily get out of balance (here understood a balanced exchange rate just as the one that assures a current account around zero): they would have to be overvalued for the duration of the strategy. This in fact happened and, not surprisingly, that decade was marked by huge financial crises. Now, in the first half of the 2000s, another major imbalance threatens international finances: the dollar has again appreciated dangerously in relation particularly to East and South-East Asian currencies, and the American current account deficit is achieving new records. Given these facts, it is understandable that one can doubt the existence of global economic governance. Instead, what they suggest is global economic "disgovernance", or a major global economic imbalance. If this is so, what are the data that support such unbalance? What are its causes? And what are the tendencies from now on?

THE 1990S CRises AND THE STRATEGY OF GROWTH WITH FOREIGN SAVINGS

I will start with the balance-of-payments crises that hit middle-income developing economies in the 1990s and early 2000s. They began with the Mexico 1994 crisis; followed by the Asian crisis in 1997, the Russian in early 1998, the Brazilian in late 1998 and finally the Argentinean in 2002. In this way, these economies, which had just experienced the major 1980s debt crises, were again facing similar problems. The failure of the international regime established in 1971, and the incapacity of the IMF to face it, became evident. Yet, while in the case of the
abandonment of the Bretton Woods fixed rates one can argue that it was inevitable – that the exchange rate regime in a world so integrated commercially and financially would not be either fixed, as Keynesians would like, or floating, as neoclassical economists dream, but managed, as they actually are (Bresser-Pereira, 2004) – in the case of the IMF the failure was evident: this organization actually contributed actively to the 1990s crises.

Although they were loosely called financial crises, they were specifically balance-of-payments crises, because they involved the suspension by the creditors of the rollover of debts. They were directly related to heavy foreign indebtedness and/or with large current account deficits, increasing loss of credit and credibility, and, as a trigger point, the suspension by foreign creditors of the refinancing of their international debts – public or private. Yet, as the countries also faced fiscal deficits, the current conventional wisdom at the IMF and the World Bank attributes the balance-of-payments crises to fiscal unbalance. This was a convenient approach because it reaffirmed the belief that all problems originated in the public sector, and coupled with the argument of the twin deficits, because it permitted that international and local authorities did not concern themselves with the increasing current account deficits. On the contrary, they were definitely not concerned, insofar as since the early 1990s, while the Brady Plan was straightening out the debt crisis, a new wave of loans for what were now called ‘emerging markets’ was taking place, and Washington came to what I called ‘the Second Washington Consensus’: the consensus that legitimated the opening of the financial accounts and the growth cum foreign savings strategy.

In the case of the Asian crisis, however, this kind of explanation was soon revealed to lack empirical support: while these countries showed reasonably balanced fiscal accounts, foreign indebtedness and large current account deficits were again the main causes. As Stiglitz (2002, p. 99) remarks: ‘the countries in East Asia had no need for additional capital, given their high savings rate, but still capital account liberalization was pushed on these countries in the late 1980s and early 1990s. I believe that capital account liberalization was the single most important factor leading to the crisis’. To this it is necessary to add the fact that banks financed speculative and irresponsible real estate investments – a specifically financial aspect of the crises. As in the case of the Latin America crisis, the trigger point was the suspension of international credit, thus configuring a typical balance-of-payments crisis. Tables 8.1 and 8.2 summarize the current account deficits of the countries just before the crisis. They also show the current account surpluses just after the crisis – surpluses that show that these countries learned the lesson fast.
As a background note prepared, just after the crisis, by the UNCTAD Secretariat (1998, p. 1) asserts:

Although different influences have been at play in different countries in the region, a common feature is that the crisis has its origin in the private sector and has taken the form of a major market failure. One can describe it either as excessive borrowing abroad by the private sector, or as excessive lending by international financial markets. In any case, as pointed out by Alan Greenspan, Chairman of the US Federal Reserve Board, it is clear that more investment monies flowed into these economies than could be profitably employed at modest risk.

In all cases, the crises had behind the conventional economics strategy of growth with foreign savings, that is, with current account deficits, which caused the overvaluation of the local currencies, and easily developed into balance-of-payments crises. If the current account deficits had been kept rigorously under control, avoiding the increase of the debt–export ratio, the crises could have been avoided, but the relative appreciation of the local currencies (in relation to an ‘equilibrium level’ where the current account is zero) and the resulting substitution of foreign for domestic savings would still prevail, causing long-term burdens in terms of resource outflows in the form of interest and dividends which were not proportional to the ‘net’ investment originated from the foreign savings.
Table 8.2 Asian crisis: current account balances 1995–99 (% of exports)

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>-12.10</td>
<td>-13.56</td>
<td>-7.75</td>
<td>+7.48</td>
<td>+10.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>-5.89</td>
<td>-15.12</td>
<td>-5.09</td>
<td>+25.60</td>
<td>+14.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>-10.31</td>
<td>-4.89</td>
<td>-6.32</td>
<td>+11.39</td>
<td>+13.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>-7.46</td>
<td>-11.94</td>
<td>-10.89</td>
<td>+4.05</td>
<td>+18.46</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: World Development Indicators Database.

Thus, I am suggesting that the IMF played an active role in stimulating foreign indebtedness and in not criticizing current account deficits. This is particularly true in the cases of the Mexican 1994, Brazilian 1998 and Argentinian 2002 crises. Contradictorily and pathetically, the IMF – which was well known for its ‘orthodox’, ‘tough’, demanding policies (and often criticized for that reason) – showed a surprising lenience in the case of the current account deficits: it actually supported exchange rate populism. The explanation behind this is its allegiance to the US sponsorship of the strategy of growth with foreign savings. It was this strategy that, since the 1970s, replaced the law of comparative advantage in neutralizing possible competition originated in developing countries, or in other words, in ‘kicking away the ladder’ that they were using to grow. In the 1970s, with the emergence of the first NICs (newly industrialized countries), the rich world understood that its anti-protectionist strategy had become exhausted (now they needed protection), and concluded that the law of comparative advantage had now little use for them. Given the new conditions, they gradually realized that the growth cum foreign savings strategy, coupled with the opening of capital accounts and the protection of property rights, could play the role of checking the threat represented by the middle-income developing economies. Countries were advised to incur current account deficits and finance them with foreign borrowing or with foreign direct investment. Growth was transformed into a competition
among developing countries to obtain more credibility and more foreign savings. Yet, as foreign loans or investments implied evaluation of the exchange rate and the increase in consumption, there was a massive substitution of foreign for domestic savings, and little or no growth in the rates of capital accumulation and in the gross domestic product (GDP) growth rates. Foreign debt, however, increased and eventually explained the balance-of-payments crises in the 1990s.

This explanation for the 1990s crises, based on current account deficits and high foreign indebtedness, is different from the conventional ‘fiscal deficit explanation’ and from its derivatives. Alves et al. (2004) listed the conventional models explaining exchange rate or balance-of-payments crises, all based on the hypotheses of ‘efficient markets’ and on disequilibria in the public sector. The first generation models explain the crises directly with the fiscal deficits; the second generation models add the games that economic authorities are engaged in when they face crisis and have to decide whether they will maintain the exchange rate fix or float it; the third generation models include the argument classically adopted by Keynesian economics: the unregulated and speculative character of financial institutions. The foreign indebtedness explanation for the 1990s crises is also different from the post-Keynesian, or the Regulation School explanation, which emphasizes the uncertainty and fragility of financial markets, and rejects the hypothesis of efficient markets. They are correct in rejecting the efficient markets hypothesis, and in emphasizing the speculative character of financial markets. These are well-known characteristics. Yet, in most cases, financial fragility and speculation will not lead to balance-of-payments crises if the country has an effective policy of limiting current account deficits and foreign indebtedness: not only public but also private indebtedness. In other words, if a country has sound fundamentals (particularly a moderate foreign debt and small or negative current account deficits, a moderate public debt and small budget deficits) it is unlikely that it will get into a balance-of-payments crisis. There are some famous cases of countries having sound fundamentals and falling in crisis, but they are obviously exceptions. Usually the crises involve fundamentals. They may have a fiscal origin, but since the 1970s they have been strongly related to foreign indebtedness – a foreign indebtedness perversely stimulated by the Washington authorities and the New York financial markets. Although historical experience shows that developed countries developed principally by using domestic savings, developing countries are encouraged to walk on the edge of the abyss of high foreign indebtedness, which would be their ‘natural’ condition, but the wise counselors do not fail to recommend them to be careful and not fall. Worse, in this game, is that there is no advantage in walking on the edge of the
abyss. Even if the country controls its current account deficits and its total indebtedness, and is not caught into crises, its growth performance will be impaired by that fact that the capital inflows evaluate the domestic currency, cause an increase in real wages and in domestic consumption, and the substitution of foreign for domestic savings.¹⁰

THE US CURRENT ACCOUNT

After the 1997 and 1998 crises, the American Treasury and the IMF probably changed some of their more radical views on the subject, but conserves their main assumptions and goals. On the other hand, no governance or institutional solution was presented to this problem at the international level. In its report, the Meltzer Commission (1999), which was created by the US Congress to study the problem, suggested that the IMF should act as a lender of last resort. The countries meeting certain ex ante conditions for solvency would be eligible for automatic financing, no additional conditionalities or negotiations being required. Yet, as the, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) 2001 World Trade Report (p. 72) pointed out:

without discretion to create its own liquidity, the Fund would have to rely on major industrial countries to secure the funds needed for such operations. In such circumstances it is highly questionable whether it would really be able to act as an impartial lender of last resort, analogous to a national central bank, since its decisions and resources would depend on the consent of its major shareholders, who are typically creditors.

That was all. The idea of restructuring the architecture of global economic governance was discarded.

Like the Asian countries, the Latin Americans also partially learned the lesson, and, as we can see in Tables 8.3 and 8.4, they stopped to incur in huge current account deficits. All the signals, however, are that the US did not. Contradictorily, if not pathetically, the country that so adamantly persuaded developing countries to engage in the growth cum foreign savings strategy – a strategy that did not consult the recipient countries’ national interest – made itself prisoner of such a disastrous proposal. While the Asian and the Latin American countries were recovering from their crises, the United States has been caught by huge budget deficits and extremely high current account deficits. These deficits
are absolute records, and are transforming the United States, the richest and most powerful nation-state in the world, into a ‘debtor nation’. According to Cline (2005, p. 1), who wrote a book with that title, ‘The [current account] deficit is larger than at any other time in the 135 years for which data are available’. The data that he presents show that after a period between 1869 and 1914 that was characterized by deficits being compensated by surpluses, the United States economy experienced a long period of current account surpluses that run up to the early 1980s. From this moment on, we have a first major fall between 1982 and 1987, current account deficits reaching 3.4 percent of GDP, a recovery up to 1992, and, since then an increasing deficit which reached 6 percent of GDP in 2004, and today is around 7 percent of GDP. As Tables 8.3 and 8.4 show, in 2004 the US$665.9 billion current account deficit represented 58 percent of exports.

This is definitely a serious problem. Some authors insist on disregarding the problem, with the argument that despite having become a debtor country, the spread of returns between those earned by US residents on their investments abroad and the average yield of foreign investments in the United States is large.11 This fact plus the revaluation effects of the 2002–03 depreciation have been neutralizing the financial costs of the negative net international position, but it does not essentially change the picture. If we understand that in the present imbalance of the American economy there is a stock and a flow aspect – the foreign debt and the current account deficit – this argument really reduces the weight of the net debt, but does not reduces the fact that the current account is highly in deficit despite the higher return on US foreign investments. There is another argument, which is mostly shared by governors of the Federal Reserve Bank.12 According to this argument, which is more explicit and more arrogant in its disregard for the foreign account deficits, the deficit is not the US’s fault, but the fault of the countries that have depreciated currencies. As The Economist reported (28 April 2005): ‘lately almost all the governors of America’s Federal Reserve have made speeches on the country’s current-account deficit, now 6.3 percent of GDP and rising. Several have sounded remarkably relaxed. Yes, they say, the gap’s big, but it’s not America’s fault; most likely, it will be closed without too much trouble.’ Thus, adjustment will have to be proceeded by others, not by the US.

The United States will probably remain the great economic and political power for many years, but it will be a declining power insofar as the dollar will tend increasingly to lose its position as an international reserve, probably to the euro. As James Galbraith (2004), wrote:
For decades, the Western World tolerated the 'exorbitant privilege' of a dollar-reserve economy because the United States was the indispensable power, providing reliable security against communism and insurrection without intolerable violence or oppression, thus conditions under which many countries on this side of the Iron Curtain grew and prospered. Those rationales evaporated 15 years ago, and the 'Global War on Terror' is not a persuasive replacement. Thus, what was once a grudging bargain with the world’s stabilizing hegemon country is now widely seen as a lingering subsidy for a predator state.

The assumption that the rest of the world, particularly the Asian dynamic countries, will continue to finance the United States indefinitely, and that what we have now is just a ‘new Bretton-Woods’ (Dooley et al., 2003) is just not realistic. These countries will be interested in financing the United States and in increasing reserves insofar as this strategy checks the appreciation of their currencies and keeps their export-led economies growing fast. But there are limits for such strategy – limits on the part of these countries, which are seeing the fragility of the American economy, limits on the part of the United States. They are seeing that the debt situation of the country is deteriorating, and that no actions are being taken to correct such trend. As Jarret remarks (2005, p. 14): ‘baseline projections’ of what would happen to the external accounts in the coming years absent any change in the dollar vary significantly, but show a rapid widening of the deficit. Thus, it is becoming increasingly clear that the total ‘transition costs’ in postponing adjustment are steadily increasing. If the decision to adjust is taken at an early stage, net transition costs will probably be high, but, as a trade-off, the economy will return sooner to stability and growth: total transition costs will be smaller. To try to postpone adjustment indefinitely will normally end up in a major crisis which will impose it.

THE STRUCTURAL AND POLITICAL ECONOMY CAUSES BEHIND

I will not discuss the prospects of this major current account deficit. The literature on the subject is already extensive, authors dividing themselves between pessimists who believe in a ‘hard landing’, and optimists predicting a ‘soft landing’. On this subject, it should only be remembered that there is an important difference between the 1985 and the present imbalance. At that time, the supremacy of the dollar was not being questioned, today it is. Additionally, at that time the United States was a net creditor internationally, today it is a net debtor:
from a US$298 billion net positive position in 1983, it went to a US$2430 billion negative net position in 2003 (Nonnenberg, 2005). Also I will not discuss the remedies for the crises. Although the United States government (Congress and Treasury) insists on attributing the problem to an ‘artificially depreciated’ Chinese currency, the fact is that the Chinese surplus explains only a small part of the United States deficit. Actually, the required American macroeconomic adjustment will involve fiscal adjustment plus the dollar depreciation. Just fiscal adjustment will probably not be enough: when the Clinton administration reached equilibrium in the fiscal account, the current account was still showing a deficit.

Table 8.3 Current account balance 1999–2004 by regions (billions of US dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>1999</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>-296.8</td>
<td>-413.4</td>
<td>-385.7</td>
<td>-473.9</td>
<td>-530.7</td>
<td>-665.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Union¹</td>
<td>+21.0</td>
<td>+5.3</td>
<td>+18.9</td>
<td>+62.7</td>
<td>+97.5</td>
<td>+88.5⁴</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America²</td>
<td>-57.0</td>
<td>-58.4</td>
<td>-53.4</td>
<td>-21.1</td>
<td>-3.5</td>
<td>+4.2⁵</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dynamic Asian³</td>
<td>+236.1</td>
<td>+241.1</td>
<td>+186.9</td>
<td>+234.2</td>
<td>+295.6</td>
<td>+386.4⁴</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil exporters⁴</td>
<td>+15.9</td>
<td>+66.7</td>
<td>+45.8</td>
<td>+48.2</td>
<td>+77.2</td>
<td>+118.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other countries</td>
<td>+88.0</td>
<td>+165.0</td>
<td>+188.8</td>
<td>+154.3</td>
<td>+67.2</td>
<td>+71.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: 1. European 15 plus Switzerland.
       2. Excludes Venezuela.
       3. Japan, China, India, Korea, Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Philippines and Vietnam, and Russia.
       4. Venezuela, Norway, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.
       5. Estimates.

Sources: World Development Indicators Database and www.cepal.org.

What I will do is to ask the political economy behind. In the case of the United States, the direct causes of the current account deficit are implied in the remedies: fiscal profligacy and an overvalued dollar. As regards the rest of the world, the explanation is China's relatively depreciated currency, and the other Asian
dynamic countries’ still more depreciated currencies (since China has a large trade surplus with the United States, but a deficit with its neighbours).

Table 8.4 Current account balance 1999–2004 by regions (% of exports)

<table>
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<th>Region</th>
<th>1999</th>
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<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
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<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>-30.72</td>
<td>-38.60</td>
<td>-38.31</td>
<td>-48.56</td>
<td>-52.00</td>
<td>-58.05</td>
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<tr>
<td>European Union</td>
<td>+0.72</td>
<td>+0.18</td>
<td>+0.63</td>
<td>+1.97</td>
<td>+2.58</td>
<td>+2.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>-17.77</td>
<td>-15.63</td>
<td>-14.69</td>
<td>-5.77</td>
<td>-0.88</td>
<td>+0.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dynamic Asian</td>
<td>+16.58</td>
<td>+14.20</td>
<td>+11.93</td>
<td>+13.80</td>
<td>+14.67</td>
<td>+15.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil exporters</td>
<td>+10.30</td>
<td>+30.88</td>
<td>+23.36</td>
<td>+24.00</td>
<td>+31.81</td>
<td>+37.72</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: See Table 3.
Sources: World Development Indicators Database and www.cepal.org

Yet, a new and major factor in explaining the increase of the current account deficit in 2005 (which was running at around US$800 billion) was the sharp increase in oil prices. According to IMF estimates, that year the current account surplus of the oil producers could reach US$400 billion against US$200 billion two years before. Only Saudi Arabia was expected to have an average surplus of US$100 billion, corresponding to 32 percent of its GDP, against China’s surplus of just 6 percent of GDP.

In a conference on the political economy of global governance, the relevant causes of looming crisis are the ones behind these direct causes. In relation to this, the central question is why the United States, that was facing relatively devalued Asian currencies for several years, and that is now confronting a major oil shock, was not able to act in time to avoid the build-up of such a huge foreign account imbalance. My argument is that there are two causes internal to the country which, combined, become particularly powerful. The first cause is rather a structural than a political economy cause. In a reference to the ‘curse of natural resources’, which particularly plague the oil-producing countries, I will call this cause the ‘curse of having a currency as an international reserve’. Usually this is viewed not as a curse but as a blessing. A country that possesses such a valuable
currency, first, is able to borrow in its own currency; second, it can borrow at a very low cost. This is certainly true, but as a trade-off, the incentive to consume too much, to save too little, and to borrow irresponsibly is strong. Not only because the costs involved in foreign borrowing are small, but also because the prestige of the national currency will push it up, will help to appreciate it. If the economic authorities are not vigilant, actively promoting investment instead of consumption, and actively managing the national currency, the tendency will be toward increasing foreign indebtedness. Given, however, the market fundamentalism that has dominated the United States administrations since the 1980s, such vigilance and management are improbable.

Combined with this structural cause there is a strictly political economy cause: ‘exchange rate populism’. In developing countries this is a well-known practice which was first detected by a distinguished Argentinean economist, Canitrot (1975). Can it be applied to a developed country like the United States – a country that, through the IMF, has been consistently criticizing fiscal populism? My answer is yes, for two reasons. First, because fiscal populism is a well-discussed phenomenon, but exchange rate populism is not. Although the concept of exchange rate populism is already present in Canitrot’s classical paper, this paper is poorly known in the North. Additionally, the expression ‘exchange rate populism’ is new: it was probably used for the first time in 2002. If fiscal populism is the state apparatus to expend more than it gets, exchange rate populism is the nation-state to expend more than it gets. Second, because Americans resist the idea that economic populism can be applied to their government. Yet, since the end of World War II, United States is experiencing a worrying political retrocession which makes it prone to both kinds of populism. In relation to exchange rate populism, the objective evidence is that the large current account deficits in the 1980s and the 2000s were associated to two populist administrations: the Reagan and the George W. Bush administrations. Such administrations were not the fruits of hazard, however. While the United States continues to grow in economic and technical terms, the political and social retrenchment is becoming increasingly evident. Increasing income concentration is the combined outcome of the technology of information revolution which reduced the demand for unskilled labor while increasing the demand for skilled and managerial labor, of the imports of industrial goods from cheap-labor developing countries, and of the immigration coming from the South. The existence of a large number of citizens excluded from the benefits of economic growth recalls developing countries like Brazil. For that reason, the pejorative expression ‘Brazilianization’ is increasingly applied to the United States. It is also
applied to Europe, but the situation there is less disquieting: income is substantially less concentrated, social rights are more universally guaranteed, and elections depend less on money.

The fact is that, in the aftermath of World War II, the United States was the example of democracy for the world, and President Roosevelt, with the New Deal, had put the United States ahead of all other countries in the protection of the poor. Today, this is over. Why? To answer this question is still more difficult, but probably a large part is related to the aggressive individualism which has taken hold of the American society since the war. For some time, in the 1960s, not only the utopian, but principally the republican values that were behind the Founding Fathers of the American republic, seemed to hold. But already at that time an individualist and neoliberal (or ultra-liberal, the opposite of what Americans call ‘liberal’) ideological wave was taking hold of hearts and minds. Sophisticated economists and philosophers like Buchanan, Olson, Friedman and Nozick, proposing ‘public choice’, ‘the impossibility of collective action in large organizations’, the ‘freedom to choose’ or ‘the minimum state’, were not just defending market fundamentalism, but preaching radical individualism and denying the existence and relevance of the public interest as an effective motivation for public action. This was a serious thing. When they were rejecting the public interest, they were automatically rejecting democratic politics which can only survive when politicians and public officials have as one of their motivating forces the fight for the public interest. Only based on considerations of the public interest were politicians able to lead the liberal social contract of the nineteenth century which limited the abuses of the authoritarian state, and the democratic contract of the twentieth century which established some limits to robber barons’ capitalism. The moral consequences of this denial for secular capitalist societies like ours are catastrophic. In the religious societies of the past, salvation and revelation offered moral criteria to subjects. In modern secular societies, however, when the public interest or the common good is discarded from political life, citizens immediately cease to have a public and moral criterion to follow. The only things that are valued are private interests, and the only rule to follow is the one of the market: to compete while simultaneously searching for monopolistic advantages. In this framework, public and social life is reduced to the market. The brute forces of capitalism — injustice, greed, corruption and disregard for the natural environment — take hold of everything. This danger has been present since capitalism became dominant in Great Britain, and since then men and women have been trying to keep it under control using as a tool the republican concept of public interest. In the seventeenth century, within the realm
of the absolute state, a new and noble activity was rising, politics – republican and democratic politics – whose role would be to limit the excesses either of the absolute state or of the greedy market. The political history of the liberal state of the nineteenth century, and of the democratic state of the twentieth century, is the history of the endeavor of republican individuals fighting to curb the absolutism of the state and the excesses of the market. In the second part of the twentieth century, however, such republican convictions grew weaker and weaker in the United States, which allowed for all types of individualist if not cynical behaviors and theories. The disorganizing and demoralizing consequences of this type of individualism are powerful, and probably help to explain the political and social retrocession in the United States, and the fact that governments are again resorting to populist practices without being punished in the elections.

**THE LOGIC BEHIND GLOBALIZATION**

Summing up, the huge current account deficit of the United States and the current account deficits of the middle-income developing countries in the 1970s and again in the 1990s have exchange rate populism behind them. But, in the times of globalization, the later ones respond also to a strategy of domination: the growth cum foreign savings strategy. While, within the United States, economic populism is just a demand of society that self-interested politicians supply, in the case of developing countries' current account deficits and balance-of-payments crises, beside self-interested and populist local politicians, we have another cause: a hegemonic power giving counsel, making recommendations and imposing conditionalities through international financial institutions. Yet, such an imperial strategy has involved a non-predicted boomerang effect. Since the Bretton Woods agreements, the United States believed that it could exert, almost alone, the leadership of the international financial system. After the dollar floated, and the agreements were buried, the United States continued to believe that it would be able to keep its control of the system untouched. The market – the supposed self-regulating market – would facilitate the job. Thus, the United States always rejected any attempt to create a more organized and structured international financial system, where vigilance on the exchange rates could be exerted. Instead, their different administrations preferred to assume, first, that the United States itself, with its sound macroeconomic policies, would be a source of rationality; second, that they could count on the support of the other developed countries, whose problems were similar to the ones they faced; third, that the IMF
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and the World Bank, with their present mandates, and duly controlled by the US Treasury, would be sufficient to keep the whole system under control – particularly the populist developing economies. But the problem that the United States and the other rich countries faced in relation to these economies was not only their ‘populism’ or their ‘nationalism’: it was also the economic threat that they represented since the instant that they began to export manufactured goods.

To neutralize this threat, they proposed that these countries adopted the growth cum foreign savings strategy and opening of capital accounts, and that they accepted globalization not as a fact but as an ideology – the ideology that nation-states had become irrelevant in the ‘borderless society’.

This strategy, however, had a disastrous consequence for the developing countries while it represented a threat for the rich ones. The 1980s foreign debt crisis constrained the United States to organize a quasi-cartel of creditors to defend their commercial banks. In the 1990s, when the growth cum foreign savings strategy was repeated, the first major crisis – the Mexican 1994 crisis – represented a threat to the American economy, and constrained the United States government to intervene with huge sums which the IMF did not have. As Davidson (2002, p. 200) remarks: ‘the Mexican crisis spilled over into the dollar problem … the dollar was initially dragged down by the peso’. The other crises were also disastrous for the developing countries which endured them, and threatening for the rich ones. The present crisis or threat of crisis represented by the American current-account deficit and the increasing foreign debt is a consequence of exchange rate populism combined with the arrogant belief that the United States has become so powerful after the collapse of communism that it could permit itself everything.

What we really have behind the present global economic disorganization is a combination of lax exchange rate policies, economic populism, and a mistaken strategy in relation to medium-income developing countries. This combination presents six major problems. First, the crises provoked by the growth cum foreign savings strategy, in the countries which obediently adopted it, were greater than expected: the idea was to limit their exports and increase the dollar income of the profits made by multinational enterprises in those countries, not to cause crises. Second, the dynamic Asian countries did not believe in that strategy, and profited from the opportunity to devise an opposite strategy of growth cum negative foreign savings. In this way, they were able to maintain their exchange rates relatively depreciated, and kept their export-led strategies going even if productivity gains did not warrant it. Third, the current account surplus achieved by the Asian countries made viable the maintenance of high levels of domestic
consumption and increasing current deficits in the United States. Fourth, the sharp 2005 increase in oil prices and the enormous trade surpluses that the oil producers experienced accentuated the current account disequilibria. Fifth, the market efficiency assumption, the idea that markets are self-regulating, is proving once again to be just ideological. Sixth, practice did not corroborate the assumed rationality on the part of the macroeconomic policies adopted by the US Treasury and the Federal Reserve. Mr Greenspan ended his 18 years as Chairman of the Federal Reserve Bank widely acclaimed for the competence and flexibility that he employed in managing the institution – and I subscribe to such praise, particularly in relation to his management of the interest rate – but it was above his powers to prevent the policy mistakes which led to the dangerous situation which the American and the world economies are in today.

CONCLUSION

I share with many the belief that a better architecture of the international financial system is required. The United States must recover control over its budget deficit, and depreciate the dollar. The IMF must stop being governed by stockholders and start being a real multilateral organization, and must have the necessary resources to act as a real lender of last resource. Exchange rates and current account deficits must be more closely followed; their equilibrium must be seen not as depending on market forces alone, but on a combination of such forces with competent macroeconomic management. Developing countries must recover control over their capital accounts, keep control of their fiscal accounts, and limit foreign borrowing. There is no heterodoxy here. Heterodox or unusual is my attribution of the developing countries’ crises to the growth cum foreign savings strategy, not the recommendation of prudence. Competent economists such as Williamson (2005) and Eichengreen (2003), for instance, are saying similar things. While the more general policies are not adopted, however, what developing countries should learn is that growth is made essentially with domestic resources – that capital is made at home, with domestic savings; that foreign savings are desirable only on special occasions, when the domestic investment opportunities, expressed in high expected profit rates, hamper the natural tendency of economic agents to increase consumption when their real income is increased; that the alternative reason for desiring foreign savings – the scarcity of the domestic savings – is the typical commonsense idea that scientific reasoning is supposed to reject. I believe that it is more realistic, at the moment, to denounce exchange rate populism and
the strategy of growth with foreign savings than to place all our bets on the reform of international financial architecture. Sooner or later such reform will take place, but while it does not, the economic authorities in each nation-state, developed or developing, should remember that the exchange rate is the more strategic macroeconomic price, and that the alternative ‘fix or float’ is false: the only sensible policy is: ‘manage it’. After all, developed countries do that: why should not developing ones?

NOTES

1. I could say ‘imperialist’ but I say ‘hegemonic’ just to distinguish classical imperialism, which implied colonies and direct economic pressures, from modern ‘hegemony’ or ‘hegemonism’, which uses ideological hegemony as a main instrument of domination. It is interesting to note that the word is used by Americans, but was first utilized by Gramsci to mean domestic ideological domination.

2. Observe that I am speaking of ‘economic’, not of ‘political’ populism. Economic populism takes place when wither the state organization or the nation-state, to expedite more than & gets, incurring respectively in chronic budget deficits or in current account deficits; political populism is essentially the practice of charismatic politicians speaking directly to the people without the intermediation of political parties.

3. With exception of Colombia, which was not indebted, but had the rollover of its credit suspended.

4. I participated directly in this crisis as Finance Minister of Brazil in 1987. For an account of this experience and also of the proposal that I made at that time with the technical support of First Boston and Warburg banks, see ‘A turning point in the debt crisis’ (Bresser-Pereira, 1999).

5. I know that the concept of what the equilibrium exchange rate is, is a theme open to huge academic debate. Here I am just proposing a pragmatic and simple criterion to define what is a ‘balanced exchange rate’, assuming that this is less demanding than the ‘equilibrium exchange rate’ concept.

6. Financial crises stricto sensu are banking and financial markets crises. Debt crises are also financial, but I prefer to call them balance-of-payments crises to indicate their specific nature.

7. The first consensus, defined by John Williamson, did not include the opening of the capital accounts, and strategy of growth with foreign savings. This strategy was defined by the US Treasury at the beginning of the Clinton administration (Bresser-Pereira and Varela, 2004).

8. This strategy was more formally formulated when Laurence Summers was Under-Secretary of the Treasury, in the Clinton administration. I have been working on the critique of such strategy for several years (Bresser-Pereira and Nakane, 2003; Bresser-Pereira and Varela, 2004; Bresser-Pereira and Gala, 2005), because I believe that to reject it is today as important for middle income developing countries as it was to criticize the law of comparative advantage at the beginning of their industrialization.

9. For a comprehensive exposition of the post-Keynesian view, see Davidson, (2002); for the Regulation School view, see Aglietta (2002).

10. For the formal critique of the strategy of growth with foreign savings see Bresser-Pereira and Gala, (2005).

11. See, for instance, Hausmann and Sturzenegger (2005). According to these two authors, in 2004 the net foreign income was US$30 billion, a number similar to that in 1980, despite the fact that
between 1980 and 1994 the US accumulated a current account deficit of US$4500 billion. We should, however, keep in mind that despite this positive US$30 billion net figure, the US current account deficit in 2004 was US$665.9 billion, as we can see in Table 8.3.

12. Not by Greenspan, but notably by the new President of the Federal Reserve Bank, Ben S. Bernanke (2005).

13. More recently these three authors Dooley, Folkerts-Landau and Garber (2005) came up with the claim that, contrary to the 'conventional analysis', the US current account deficit is also no cause of concern because the euro is supposed to appreciate in relation to the dollar, and, in a second phase, the euro and the dollar will appreciate relative to the renminbi, but these are just predictions. Eventually this will happen, but probably in a troubling way, not in the smooth way that the authors suppose.

14. On the concept of net and total transition costs, see Bresser-Pereira and Abud (1997).

15. The difference between this figure and the corresponding 2004 figure in Table 8.3 is the consequence of a smaller number of oil producers in this table.


19. A recent study by the Bureau of the Budget of the US Congress shows that, in the US, the incomes of Latin American immigrants working in construction, textiles, maintenance operations, catering and restaurants are 50 percent less than is paid to Americans for the same jobs. In only the last decade, the number of immigrant workers increased from 13 to 21 million. Such growth represented half of the growth of the labor force in that period. (Valor [Financial Times] 15 November 2005).

20. Americans prefer to call their country the 'benevolent hegemons', but we know well that all countries that achieve economic and military dominance tend to act in imperial ways in relation to others, that is, they tend to protect their interests at the costs of the others' interests by using their greater power. The forms under which this power is exerted change. In the past, the use of force and direct exploitation was the norm, in present days it is essentially ideological, and is conveyed through recommendations and pressures for weaker countries to adopt policies that do not consult their national interests.

REFERENCES


